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eeting Europe’s 2020 objectives of smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth is even 
more of a challenge for the financial sector 
than for the EU as a whole. Smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth is just the opposite of what the 
financial sector stood for, and how it continues to be 
perceived by the public. The huge regulatory agenda 
that is on the table should tame the financial sector, but 
whether it will help it to meet the Europe 2020 
objectives is an open question (see European 
Commission, 2010a).  
The Financial Services Action Programme (FSAP) was 
one of the core pieces of the Lisbon Agenda. Drafted 
initially in 1999 to secure the full benefits of the single 
currency, it was merged into the Lisbon Agenda in 
June 2000 “to foster growth and employment by better 
allocation of capital and reducing its cost”. The 
benefits of the single financial market were later 
quantified in several studies for the European 
Commission to amount to at least 1% of GDP annually 
(see European Commission, 2003). These studies 
should be reviewed carefully. The last ten years have 
seen such a large-scale waste of capital (excessive real 
estate investment in Spain, Ireland and the Baltics, and 
unsustainable consumption booms in Greece and 
Portugal) that one might doubt the benefits of financial 
market integration – at least in the absence of a better 
regulatory framework. 
As a result of the financial crisis, we are now moving 
in the opposite direction of the last ten years. Not only 
is financial integration receding on several indicators, 
but a vast regulatory plan is being put together where 
safety and stability take precedence, ultimately over 
credit growth and profitability. In addition, the 
combined effect of these measures, developed at 
global, European and national level, may create new 
barriers to market integration.  
The objective of this policy brief is to provide a brief 
analysis of the impact of the financial crisis on the 
banking sector from the perspective of Europe 2020. 
The article starts with an overview of the effect of the 
financial crisis on large banks. It then reviews the key 
regulatory reform proposals and discusses their impact 
on the structure and profitability of the banking sector. 
A financial system under pressure 
Compared to the period of unrestrained credit growth 
before the crisis, the post-crisis period is marked by 
cracks and pain throughout the EU. The key word now 
is  deleveraging, i.e. a reduction in the degree of 
indebtedness in the financial system. Already in early 
2008, after the first cracks appeared with the collapse 
of the securitisation market, it was expected that the 
financial system would have to reduce leverage. Back 
then, however, analysts did not foresee that the process 
would be so painful and affect the ‘real’ economy to 
such a degree. By November 2008, it started to 
become apparent that the financial crisis would have 
profound and far-reaching implications, leading to an 
average drop in GDP in the EU of 4% in 2009, the 
sharpest fall in post-World War II history. To limit the 
downside and allow the credit channel to continue to 
function, EU member state governments reacted with a 
massive support programme for the financial sector in 
a panoply of debt guarantee schemes, equity support 
and bad bank schemes, amounting in total to some 
12.5% of GDP (European Commission, 2010b). For 
the non-financial sector, fiscal stimuli were provided to 
differing degrees across EU member states.  
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Figure 1. Deleveraging in Europe’s ‘€1 trillion banks’ 
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Note: We kept the balance sheet data in local currency (euro, sterling and Swiss franc) to arrive at a correct comparison of the magnitude of the 
decline, as the exchange rate movements were substantial. End-of-year exchange rates £ to the € are 0.733 (2007), 0.952 (2008) and 
0.888 (2009); CHF 1.655, 1.485 and 1.484. For Lloyds and Commerzbank, comparable 2007 data were unavailable, as in both cases 
the banks went through a merger in 2008, in the Commerzbank case with Dresdner, and in the Lloyds case with HBOS. 
 
Has deleveraging started? The evidence is mixed. 
Large banks seem to have engaged in this process. 
Among Europe’s 14 banks with assets of €1 trillion or 
more, it can be noted that the total balance sheet 
reduction amounts to about €3.5 trillion or 16% from 
2008 to 2009 (see Figure 1). In some cases, namely 
Commerzbank, ING, Lloyds, RBS and UBS,
1 this 
deleveraging was forced upon the bank in return for 
state aid, under the EU Treaty’s state aid rules. Others 
did so voluntarily, such as Barclays and Deutsche 
Bank. At the same time, the core capital ratios (equity 
and reserves) increased from an average of 2.8% in 
2008 to 4.1% in 2009, with core capital increasing 
from €638 billion to €781 billion for the total of the 
banks in our sample. 
On an aggregate basis, deleveraging is less 
pronounced. ECB data indicate a slight drop in the 
total liabilities of the euro area banking system since 
mid-2009, but certainly a halt to the sustained balance 
sheet growth observed since 2002. Core capital ratios, 
on the other hand, have strengthened from 5.9% at the 
end of 2007 to 6.3% for the first quarter of 2010.
2 
                                                      
1 For Commerzbank and ING, the deleveraging as agreed with 
the EU Commission under the EU Treaty’s state aid rules 
amounts to over 45%, for RBS over 25% and for Lloyds under 
20% (see Lannoo & Sutton, 2010). 
2 ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse, Credit institutions balance 
sheet. 
Seen over a longer period, the deleveraging of these 
large banks is possibly only the beginning. Growth in 
size and consolidation are processes that have been 
going on at global level since the early 1990s. Total 
assets of the global top 25 banks are now 6 times 
higher than in 1990. In 1990, none of the largest banks 
had a balance sheet larger than its home country’s 
GDP. In 2008, seven of these top 25 banks had assets 
exceeding the home GDP – all European by no 
coincidence. In the US case, the largest bank reached 
15% of GDP (JP Morgan, 2010, pp. 5-7). 
At the EU level, authorities had stimulated the process 
of scale enlargement with the single market 
programme, which aimed at strengthening the global 
competitiveness of the EU’s financial firms. The EU 
intervened actively to promote cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions of financial groups (see, for example, 
ABN-Amro, Santander, Unicredit), but without having 
a solid framework in place for the integrated 
supervision of such groups or for burden-sharing in 
case of failure. The weaknesses in the supervisory 
framework are being addressed at the regional and 
global level, but the issues of burden-sharing and 
resolution remain highly controversial.  
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Figure 2. Capital strengthening in Europe’s ‘€1 trillion banks’ 
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Source: Banks’ balance sheets. 
 
What’s cooking? 
A vast regulatory programme is in the making at 
global, European and national levels to draw the 
lessons from the financial crisis. At the global level, 
the G-20 is in the lead, in cooperation with the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Its conclusions set general de 
minimis rules, although so far, the G-20 has gone into 
considerable detail, and the implementation of its 
recommendations is advancing smoothly. The overall 
ambition of the G-20 is to achieve comprehensive 
regulation of all financial markets, products and 
institutions. 
The EU is following the G-20 process closely, and, at 
the same time, strengthening the framework for cross-
border supervision of EU groups and introducing new 
rules. By early 2011, the new supervisory authorities 
should be in place. They will participate in the 
supervisory colleges of pan-European groups, 
constitute pan-European supervisory data bases and 
have the facility to delegate supervision and mediate 
amongst national authorities. On the regulatory side, 
efforts at harmonisation can be subdivided into three 
sets of initiatives:  
-  Prudential: Basel III, or capital requirements 
Directives (CRDs) III and IV; the resolution fund; 
common rules for central counterparties (CCPs) 
and central securities depositories (CSDs). 
-  Product: Hedge and other alternative non-
regulated funds; rules for standardisation of OTC 
derivatives and their clearing through CCPs. 
-  Conduct: Credit rating agencies; bank 
remuneration; stricter rules against market abuse 
and short selling. 
The core measures of the package are the new 
prudential rules for banks. One part, covering higher 
capital requirements for trading books, remuneration at 
banks and rules on securitisation have almost been 
adopted,
3 but the most substantial part is still being 
debated, especially the rules on minimum capital ratios 
and buffers, dynamic provisioning and liquidity ratios. 
So far, only one new post-crisis measure has been 
effectively adopted in the EU, the credit rating 
agencies regulation – although the debate about their 
role seems to be far from over – while most others are 
awaiting adoption by the European Parliament and EU 
Council (see the annex for an overview of financial 
crisis-related regulation at the EU level).  
Also at the national level, initiatives are being taken to 
adapt the institutional and regulatory frameworks. In 
                                                      
3 Some changes to the CRD were adopted as technical 
amendments by the European Commission in April and July 
2009. It concerns modifications to the rules on large exposures 
(to include off-balance sheet items) and securitizations 
(including the 5% retention on the balance sheets of the 
originating institution).  4 | Karel Lannoo 
several EU member states, the institutional framework 
for supervision is changing, with more powers veering 
towards the central bank in general, and a curtailing of 
the financial supervisory authorities (see, for example, 
the experience of Belgium and the UK). Some member 
states have also unilaterally adopted new laws that may 
impact the free provision of financial services (such as 
rules on liquidity regulation and living wills in the 
UK). 
Other measures are still in the pipeline. Over the last 
few months, the momentum behind a bank balance 
sheet and/or transaction tax has grown. Initially 
proposed by Gordon Brown in November 2009, it 
gained significant weight in January 2010 when 
President Obama proposed a Financial Crisis 
Responsibility Fee. It is now commonly expected that 
there will be a form of a bank activity and/or 
transaction tax in most EU countries to reduce leverage 
and reinforce financial stability, as proposed by the 
European Council in June 2010. The proceeds of such 
a tax could go into national resolution funds.
4 A 
second measure concerns the structure of banking. The 
‘Volcker rule’, which forbids banks from engaging in 
proprietary trading while maintaining interests in 
hedge and private equity funds, was adopted in the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 25 June 2010.
5 Although the EU has 
so far indicated that it will not adopt anything similar, 
the new UK coalition government agreement states 
that it will examine a possible separation of investment 
from commercial banking. Restricting certain financial 
activities raises many issues that touch upon the core 
of banking, namely maturity transformation between 
short-term liabilities and long-term assets (see Micossi 
et al., 2010, pp. 20-21). 
The brave new world for banking: Smaller 
is beautiful 
The combined effect of global, EU and national rules 
means that regulation will drive banks’ business 
models even more than has been the case so far. It will 
lead to lower profitability for global universal banks 
and provides a strong incentive to reconsider the 
universal model in favour of a segmentation of the 
financial system into niches, to realise the benefits of 
lower capital charges for specialist players and to 
reduce complexity in general. This will be accelerated 
                                                      
4 See the European Commission consultation (May 2010) 
which however stops short of proposing a European resolution 
fund 
5 The ‘Volcker rule’ is similar in several respects to the 1933 
US Glass-Steagal Act, but it does not propose a formal 
separation of investment and commercial banking. The US 
House and Senate are currently reconciling the financial reform 
bills.   
by the possible introduction of a bank tax, whose scope 
is not yet known. 
Not surprisingly, the banking industry is up in arms. JP 
Morgan (2010) calculated that the capital needs of 
global banks would be an additional 19% of tangible 
equity as a result of the new measures. It estimates that 
profitability (measured as return on equity) of global 
banks would decline from 13.3% in 2007 to 5.4% in 
2011, due to the different proposals now on the table. 
The bank argues that it would be difficult to attract 
private capital at these levels, and hence the pricing of 
financial products would have to increase 
substantially, by about 33%. However, this argument 
overlooks the fact that with higher capital 
requirements, banking would become a much safer 
business, thus requiring a lower return on capital. 
Rating agencies see a huge need for additional capital 
in the banking sector. As governments progressively 
retrieve the guarantees and support schemes, 
downgrades will follow, leading to additional capital 
and refinancing needs peaking in 2012 (Fitch, 2010). 
This is aggravated by the shortening of the maturity 
profile of banks’ bond financing during the crisis (BIS, 
2010, p. 79). Also the Institute for International 
Finance, the global bank’s lobby, sees a huge need for 
additional capital to comply with the new rules. This 
will have a bigger impact in Europe, because of its 
more bank-driven system. 
From a shareholder perspective, imposing higher 
capital requirements is like diluting the capital of the 
bank. Since banks were operating on an extremely thin 
capital base, shareholders were happily taking the 
upside of this situation in the form of capital gains and 
dividend payments, but the downside was covered by 
the state, through the support measures in crisis 
periods, and because of the preferential treatment of 
debt, less tax income to the state. Hence, imposing 
higher capital requirements should be beneficial for 
states and taxpayers. Furthermore, faced with the 
spectre of Basel III, banks have successfully argued for 
long transition periods, arguing that a rapid 
introduction would lead to further deleveraging and 
decline in credit availability. However, the opposite 
may be argued: lengthening the transition prolongs 
uncertainty and allows banks to restrict lending. It has 
therefore been proposed to make the transition period 
as short as possible: the faster banks are recapitalised, 
the sooner they will be able to borrow and lend again. 
If it were to be done overnight, banks would not have 
the time to restrict credit nor to argue the need for 
further delays again at a later stage. Strong banks 
would cut dividend and bonus payments (the payout 
levels for 2009 are proof that a huge opportunity was Europe 2020 and the Financial System: Smaller is beautiful | 5 
already missed); weaker banks may resort to debt to 
equity swaps.
6  
Banks should also explore other business models. The 
question can be raised whether it remains interesting to 
be a global universal bank in the new regulatory 
environment. According to the JP Morgan report cited 
above, scale continues to have an advantage, to serve a 
larger and more complex client base. Economies of 
scale emerge from spreading fixed costs over a larger 
revenue base and lower funding costs, but what is an 
optimal size and where do scale effects really stop 
have not been quantified – a well-known gap in the 
academic literature. In addition, Basel III changes the 
paradigm. Whereas under the Basel II framework, 
capital needs were declining with the size, or barely 
existed if at all, for SPVs and OTC derivatives trading, 
for example. Now the opposite will be true. The new 
Basel framework adopts tougher standards for 
‘Systemically Important Financial Institutions’, 
requiring them to internalise the risks they create for 
the public at large. It sets higher capital requirements 
for trading book activities, counterparty credit risk, 
complex securitisations and re-securitisations, and 
OTC derivative activities. Normal capital requirements 
will be allowed for centrally cleared derivatives, but 
this will require banks to participate in the capital of 
these CCPs. Before, these banks could propose their 
own risk models for these activities. As authorities will 
be extremely wary not to have too-big-to-fail banks 
under their supervision, certainly within the EU as 
long as fiscal policy remains local, enforcement will be 
guaranteed. 
In addition, the new bank tax that is being devised in 
several EU member states will target a certain part of a 
bank’s liabilities, minus the capital, or tax the sum of 
profits and remuneration in the financial sector.
7 Such 
tax would tend to reduce the size of the financial 
sector, as it would tax above-level profits and 
remuneration (IMF, 2010). This will again hit the 
larger banks the hardest. Moreover, in the EU this tax 
will be raised at the local level to fund a national 
resolution fund, which will disadvantage cross-border 
banks that have expanded through acquisitions (as 
most have in the EU). 
                                                      
6 See “Shock therapy is best cure for banks”, Financial Times, 
Editorial, 29 June 2010 and Daniel Gros, “Cost of Basel III”, 
mimeo, June 2010. The Swiss supervisory authority introduced 
a minimum leverage ratio at the end of 2008 – without creating 
a strong competitive handicap for their banks. 
7 See Joint Statement by the French, UK and German 
Governments on bank levies, 22 June 2010 (download at: 
http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/junebudget_joint_statement.pdf). 
 
Segmenting a financial group according to its business 
lines may, from a regulatory capital and supervisory 
perspective, become a more advantageous model. At 
its core, a financial group can focus on commercial and 
consumer lending, but split all of its specialised 
activities into separate entities. Asset management can 
come under the UCITS Directive, and be subject to a 
much lower capital charge;
8 money transmission (and 
short-term credit) can fall under the payment services 
Directive, investment services under MiFID, and be 
subject to the trading book capital requirements. OTC 
derivative positions could be executed through a hedge 
fund, and non-banking entities will not be subject to 
the bank tax. Distribution would happen through 
intermediaries and advisors. A segmented structure 
would also make it much easier to deal with 
restructuring and liquidation in case of problems, and 
conform to the supervisory demands for a 
‘contingency plan’.  
In fact, the segmentation process has already begun. 
Bank insurance is regarded as passé. The ING Group, 
as an example of bank insurance in the EU, will divest 
its insurance activities and revert to basic banking (see 
ING 2009 Annual Report). As large banks discover the 
burden of the new Basel III package, they will start to 
consider other options. At the same time, competition 
                                                      
8 See Lannoo (2010) for a comparison of capital requirements 
in the asset management industry. 
Box 1. New capital rules and charges for banks 
-  Capital (Basel III) 
o  Tighter definition of core capital (confined 
mainly to common equity and retained 
earnings) 
o  A maximum leverage ratio (or a minimum ratio 
of capital to total assets) 
o  Counter-cyclical capital buffers, requiring 
banks to accumulate extra capital during 
upswings 
o  Forward-looking or dynamic provisioning 
-  Minimum level of very liquid assets (liquidity 
coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio) 
-  Rules on securitisation (including e.g. the 5% 
retention for securitisation) 
-  Tighter trading book rules (tighter calculation of 
value-at-risk) 
-  Rules on remuneration 
-  Extra capital charges for OTC derivatives, other 
derivatives mandatorily cleared through central 
counterparty (CCP) 
-  Bank tax (liability, financial activity and/or 
transaction tax) 6 | Karel Lannoo 
is increasing from non-financial operators, who are 
looking to enter the financial system as niche players. 
Telecom and retail companies which manage large 
user-datasets are looking to enter the consumer loan or 
money transmission market. Also, the continuing 
uncertainty about the financial system has led 
corporates to create new banks. A consortium of 17 
large corporations has started a new cooperative bank, 
the Corporate Funding Association, and Siemens has 
also stated that it would start a bank.
9 
Conclusions 
The Europe 2020 proposals regarding the financial 
system deserve closer elaboration as regards the 
modalities of their introduction and impact on the 
‘real’ economy. Compared to the Lisbon agenda era, 
regulatory reform of the financial sector is even more 
crucial now, whereas it only receives scant attention in 
the Europe 2020 programme. The financial sector is 
currently in serious disrepair and the proposals on the 
table to better regulate financial activity will have a 
profound impact on the future structure of the financial 
system. The sector is resisting change and has argued 
with insistence that the new measures, essentially the 
Basel III proposals, should be toned down and phased-
in progressively, because of the huge capital needs and 
its impact on lending. However, given the ongoing 
uncertainty regarding the soundness of the European 
banking sector, it could be argued from a public policy 
perspective that these measures should be introduced 
without delay. This would also force banks to consider 
other business models, which would at the same time 
reduce complexity and ease bank resolution and 
restructuring. 
                                                      
9 See www.corp-funding.com and Siemens announcement, 28 
June 2010.  
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Annex. Financial crisis-related regulation at EU level: An overview 
Measure  Purpose  Status  EU Council Presidency-2
nd half  2010 
Depositor protection schemes  Increase minimum level of protection to 
€50,000 
Adopted October 2008, new consultation 
2
nd half 2010 
 
Credit rating agencies  Introduce single licence  Adopted April 2009 
Amended June 2010 
 
Start discussions in Council 
Bank capital (CRD), amendments: 
•  Securitisation, large exposures 
•  Executive remuneration, trading book and 
complex products 
•  Leverage ratio, capital buffers, liquidity 
regulation  
 
•  Min. 5% on a bank’s books 
•  Extra charge for high pay packages 
•  Higher capital charge for trading book, more 
and better capital, minimum liquidity 
 
•  Commission directives (adopted April 
and June 2009) 
•  Draft directive (July 2009) 
•  Consultation (April 2010), draft 
directive July 2010? 
 
 
•  Conciliation with EP 2
nd half 2010 
•  Discussions start in EU Council 
Hedge funds  Regulate non-regulated segment of fund 
industry 
Draft directive (April 2009)  Decision in EU Council (May 2010), 
conciliation with EP 2
nd half 2010 
Prospectus Directive  Simplification  Consultation (January 2009), draft 
amendments September 2009 
Discussions in EU Council 
Market abuse  Improve and simplify directive  Consultation (April 2009)  Draft directive 2
nd half 2010? 
Depositaries of funds  Segregate funds from depositaries  Consultation (May 2009)  Draft directive 2
nd half 2010? 
OTC derivative markets and infrastructures  Transparency, mandate central clearing for 
standardised OTC derivatives 
Consultation (June 2010)  Draft regulation September 2010 
European Systemic Risk Board  Indentify macro-financial risks  Consultation (June 2009), draft and 
Council decision (Dec 2009) 
Conciliation with EP 2
nd half 2010 
European Banking Authority  Coordinate banking regulation and supervision  Consultation (June 2009), draft and 
Council Decision (Dec 2009) 
Conciliation with EP 2
nd half 2010 
European Insurance Authority  Coordinate insurance regulation and supervision Consultation (June 2009), draft and 
Council Decision (Dec 2009) 
Conciliation with EP 2
nd half 2010 
European Securities Markets Authority  Coordinate securities markets regulation and 
supervision 
Consultation (June 2009), draft and 
Council Decision (Dec 2009) 
Conciliation with EP 2
nd half 2010 
Omnibus directive  Adapt existing rules to ESFS  Draft directive (October 2009)  Conciliation with EP 2
nd half 2010 
Crisis resolution procedures and funds  Coordinate national rules  Consultation (Oct.2009, May 2010)  Draft directive 2
nd half 2010? 
 About CEPS
Place du Congrès 1 • B-1000 Brussels
Tel : 32(0)2.229.39.11 • Fax : 32(0)2.219.41.51
E-mail:  info@ceps.eu
Website : www.ceps.eu
Founded in Brussels in 1983, the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) is among the 
most experienced and authoritative think 
tanks operating in the European Union today. 
CEPS serves as an leading forum for debate on 
EU affairs, but its most distinguishing feature 
lies in its strong in-house research capacity, 
complemented by an extensive network of 
partner institutes throughout the world.
Goals
•	 To	carry	out	state-of-the-art	policy	research	leading	
to	solutions	to	the	challenges	facing	Europe	today.
•	 To	achieve	high	standards	of	academic	excellence	
and	maintain	unqualified	independence.
•	 To	act	as	a	forum	for	discussion	among	
stakeholders	in	the	European	policy	process
•	 To	provide	a	regular	flow	of	authoritative	
publications	offering	policy	analysis	and	
recommendations.
•	 To	build	collaborative	networks	of	researchers,	
policy-makers	and	business	representatives	across	
the	whole	of	Europe.
•	 To	disseminate	our	findings	and	views	through	our	
publications	and	public	events.
Assets
•	 Multidisciplinary,	multinational	&	multicultural	
research	team.	
•	 Complete	independence	to	set	its	own	research	
priorities	and	freedom	from	any	outside	influence.
•	 Seven	research	networks,	comprising	numerous	
other	highly	reputable	institutes,	to	complement	
and	consolidate	CEPS’	research	expertise	and	to	
extend	its	outreach.
•	 An	extensive	membership	base	of	Corporate	and	
Institutional	Members,	which	provide	expertise	and	
practical	experience	and	act	as	a	sounding	board	
for	CEPS	policy	proposals.
Programme Structure
Research	Programmes
Economic	&	Social	Welfare	Policies •	
Financial	Markets	&	Institutions •	
Energy	&	Climate	Change	 •	
Regulatory	Policy •	
EU	Foreign,	Security	&	Neighbourhood	Policy •	
Justice	&	Home	Affairs •	
Politics	&	Institutions •	
Agricultural	&	Rural	Policy •	
Research	Networks
European	Capital	Markets	Institute	(ECMI) •	
European	Climate	Platform	(ECP) •	
European	Credit	Research	Institute	(ECRI) •	
European	Network	for	Better	Regulation		 	 •	
	 (ENBR)
European	Network	of	Economic	Policy		 	 •	
	 Research	Institutes	(ENEPRI)
European	Policy	Institutes	Network	(EPIN) •	
European	Security	Forum	(ESF) •	
CEPS	organises	a	variety	of	activities,	involving	its	
members	and	other	stakeholders	in	the	European	
policy	debate,	including	national	and	EU-level	
policy-makers,	academics,	corporate	executives,	
NGOs	and	the	media.	Its	funding	is	obtained	
from	a	variety	of	sources,	including	membership	
fees,	project	research,	foundation	grants,	
conferences	fees,	publication	sales	and	an	annual	
grant	from	the	European	Commission.